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RETHINKING CIVIL-LAW TAXONOMY: 
PERSONS, THINGS, AND THE PROBLEM OF 
DOMAT’S MONSTER 
Eric H. Reiter∗
 
Since the time of Gaius, whose Institutes divided private law 
into persons, things, and actions, the categories of persons and 
things have enjoyed an implicit (and sometimes explicit) primacy 
as the summa divisio within the private law.  Though the third 
category–“actions” in Gaius and Justinian, today reinterpreted as 
“obligations” or “ways of acquiring property”1–has by now 
perhaps outstripped the others, “persons” and “things” continue to 
have pride of place in civil codes, and by setting up legal subjects 
and legal objects, respectively, they make possible the law of 
obligations in which persons and things interact. 
Gaius’ structure–and its implicit hierarchy–has cast a long 
shadow.2      It     still     provides     the     basic     architecture    of    
the     civil     law–sometimes     explicitly,3      sometimes       more  
 
∗  Assistant Professor (History/Law and Society), Department of History, 
Concordia University, Montreal; of the Bar of Quebec; 
ereiter@alcor.concordia.ca.  
I would like to thank Olivier Moréteau for inviting me to present these ideas 
at the Civil Law Workshop at LSU, and the workshop participants for the 
discussion that ensued.  My arguments also greatly benefited from the comments 
and suggestions of Jean-Guy Belley, Nicholas Kasirer, David Lametti, Rod 
Macdonald, Desmond Manderson, and Shannon McSheffrey.  Earlier 
unpublished versions of this article were awarded prizes by the Fondation du 
Barreau du Québec, the Quebec chapter of the Association Henri Capitant, and 
the Association des professeures et professeurs de droit du Québec, and I thank 
these organizations for their recognition and financial support.  
1. See Peter Stein, The Quest for a Systematic Civil Law, 90 PROC. BRIT. 
ACAD.: LECTURES & MEMOIRS 147, 156-57 (1995) (discussing the early-modern 
developments).  In what follows I will use the term “obligations” except in cases 
where the historical category “actions” is specifically meant. 
2. See generally Donald R. Kelley, Gaius noster: Substructures of Western 
Social Thought, 84 AM. HIST. REV. 619 (1979).  
3. For example in Books 1-3 of the French Code civil (Des personnes; Des 
biens et des différentes modifications de la propriété, Des différentes manières 
dont on acquiert la propriété) or Books 1-3 of the Louisiana Civil Code (Of 
190              JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES                [Vol. 1 
 
                                                                                                            
subtly4–and for this reason it is unlikely to disappear any time 
soon.  Even in the common law, the influence of this structure is 
evident in Blackstone’s Commentaries and in the recent English 
Private Law, to name just two examples.5  My purpose in what 
follows is recast the dichotomy between persons and things as a 
problem not of classification (what goes where) but of the 
construction and function of legal categories as normative spaces 
within which classification takes place.  To do this, I think we need 
to replace a static view of legal categories as discrete pigeonholes 
with a dynamic view that emphasizes their interactions.  This idea 
of interaction is crucial, I will argue, since legal categories do not 
exist in analytical isolation.  Rather, they are in tension with each 
other, their fluid and contingent boundaries continually being 
renegotiated, with meaning coming out of this process of give and 
take.  Human interactions themselves are inconceivably complex–
what William James called a “great blooming, buzzing 
confusion”6–and a static view of legal categories as boxes labeled 
“persons,” “things,” and “obligations” belies this complexity.  My 
point is that the blurring of the boundaries between categories is 
not a failure of taxonomy, but a valuable tool for enriching legal 
analysis and bringing it into closer alignment with human 
experience.7
Two puzzles of categorization–one recent, the other historical–
can serve to introduce and illustrate my point about the importance 
of an interactive understanding of legal categories.  Both 
 
 
Persons; Things and the Different Modifications of Ownership; Of the Different 
Modes of Acquiring the Ownership of Things). 
4. For example in the General Part of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (which 
begins with the divisions Persons, Things/Animals, and Legal Transactions) or 
in the Preliminary Provision of the Civil Code of Québec (“The Civil Code of 
Québec, in harmony with the Charter of human rights and freedoms and the 
general principles of law, governs persons, relations between persons, and 
property”).  
5. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
(1765-69) (1979); ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW (Peter Birks ed., 2000). 
6. 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 462 (Frederick H. 
Burkhardt et al. eds., 1981). 
7. See generally STEPHEN WADDAMS, DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: 
CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL REASONING (2003) 
(discussing blurring and overlapping of categories in judicial reasoning in the 
common law). 
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underscore some of the difficulties in negotiating the boundary 
between persons and things by putting into the foreground the 
constructed and hence normative nature of legal categories. 
The first puzzle comes from an unusual news story.8  John 
Wood of South Carolina failed to make payments at a self-storage 
facility, and found his possessions had been sold at auction in 
North Carolina.  Another man, Shannon Whisnant, purchased a 
barbeque smoker at the auction, and found when he brought it 
home that it contained a dried-out, severed human leg–Wood’s leg, 
in fact, which he had lost in a plane crash some years before, had 
hung on his fence to dry out, and was keeping so he could be 
cremated with it after his death.  Whisnant, who said he was 
“freaked out” by his find, called the police, who confiscated the 
leg.  But Whisnant quickly had second thoughts, realizing, a bit 
belatedly, the profit potential.  With Halloween coming, he began 
charging people for a peek inside the now empty smoker, $3 for 
adults, $1 for children, and he sought to reclaim the leg to improve 
gate receipts. 
The dispute quickly became legalized, with each side groping 
for legal vocabulary to characterize claims that fell into the gray 
area between persons and property.  Whisnant asserted a property 
right, claiming that since he had bought the smoker and its 
contents, he was now rightful owner of the leg.  Wood on the other 
hand called this “despicable,” and asserted a personhood claim: the 
leg–though currently detached–was integral to his plans for post-
mortem bodily reunification.9  Sensing trouble–he no longer had 
the leg, remember–Whisnant suggested a joint custody 
arrangement, the details of which unfortunately did not make it 
into the papers, but which in any case Wood refused.  The police 
sided with Wood, but on property rather than personhood grounds.  
They gave him back his leg because, by their way of thinking, 
“The guy don’t have a leg to stand on:” Whisnant had given up 
ownership when he surrendered the leg to the police.10  In the end, 
perhaps inevitably, the affair left behind the realms of personhood 
 
8. Up in arms over a leg, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, October 4th, 2007, at A2.  
9. In many ways this is a real-life analogue of the hypothetical “case of the 
stolen hand” discussed in JEAN-PIERRE BAUD, L’AFFAIRE DE LA MAIN VOLÉE: 
UNE HISTOIRE JURIDIQUE DU CORPS 9-16 (1993). 
10. Amputee gets leg, princess wins case, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, October 
6th, 2007, at A2. 
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and property for a different branch of law: obligations and 
contract, as the parties agreed to settle their dispute before the 
cameras in the television courtroom of Judge Greg Mathis.11  
Judge Mathis opted for personhood, or did he?  Wood got his leg 
back, but Mathis ordered Wood to reimburse Whisnant $5,000 for 
the cost of the leg.12
My second puzzle is more serious in intent but it touches the 
same problem of the tension, even the competition, between the 
categories of persons and things.  It comes from the seventeenth-
century French jurist Jean Domat. In his 1689 treatise The Civil 
Law in Its Natural Order, in the course of his discussion of the 
status of persons resulting from nature (rather than from law), 
Domat lists a number of liminal states to illustrate particular 
analytical problems.13  Domat’s list includes children born dead, 
children still in the womb, premature children, posthumous 
children, hermaphrodites, eunuchs, the insane (Les Insensez), the 
completely deaf and mute, and those suffering dementia or other 
mental deficiencies (Ceux qui sont en démence, & dans ces autres 
imbécillitez).  The list ends, however–most interestingly–with 
“monsters that do not have human form” (Les monstres qui n’ont 
pas la forme humaine).  Domat writes:14
Monsters that do not have human form are not considered 
to be persons, nor are they counted as the children of those 
who give birth to them.  But those that have the essentials 
of human form and just have something extra or something 
missing count like other children. 
Although monsters that do not have human form are not 
considered to be persons nor to be children, they count as 
such with respect to their parents, and they are counted 
among their children for the purposes of any privileges or 
 
11. Eric Connor, TV judge to decide who gets amputated leg, USA TODAY, 
October 10th, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/offbeat/2007-
10-10-amputated-leg_N.htm  (last visited Novemeber 6, 2008).  
12. TV judge rules South Carolina man can keep amputated leg, but must 
pay $5,000, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, November 1st, 2007, available 
at www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/01/america/NA-ODD-US-Abandoned-
Leg.php  (last visited Novemeber 6, 2008).  
13. 1 JEAN DOMAT, LES LOIX CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL 11-13 
(Luxembourg: André Chevalier, 1702).  The list that follows translates as 
directly as possible Domat’s terminology. 
14. Id. at 13 (author’s translation). 
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exemptions granted to fathers or mothers according to the 
number of children. 
Both Domat’s monster and Wood’s leg are taxonomic puzzles 
because they fall squarely between our categories of “persons” and 
“things.”  Wood’s leg clearly has a dual nature–a money-making 
commodity to Whisnant, a severed part of himself to Wood.  
Domat’s monster, though it appears in the discussion of persons, is 
explicitly not a person, but a taxonomic riddle that challenges the 
integrity of legal categories and the binary either/or classificatory 
decisions that taxonomy is normally held to require.  I would like 
to leave aside the severed leg for the time being and look more 
closely at the problem of Domat’s monster and its implications for 
our understanding of the workings of legal taxonomy. 
Domat is not alone in his discussion of monsters.  In his 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, for example, Blackstone 
writes:  
A MONSTER, which hath not the shape of mankind, but in 
any part evidently bears the resemblance of the brute 
creation, hath no inheritable blood, and cannot be heir to 
any land, albeit it be brought forth in marriage: but, 
although it hath deformity in any part of its body, yet if it 
hath human shape, it may be heir.  This is a very ancient 
rule in the law of England; and its reason is too obvious, 
and too shocking, to bear a minute discussion.15
Blackstone’s modestly veiled reference at the end of this 
passage is fleshed out by his source, Bracton, writing in the more 
brazen 13th century: 
Who may and may not be called children and reckoned as 
such.  Those born of unlawful intercourse, as out of 
adultery and the like, are not reckoned among children, nor 
those procreated perversely, against the way of human 
kind, as where a woman brings forth a monster or a 
prodigy.16
 
15. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at book 2, chap. 15 (vol. 2 at 246-47) 
[orthography modernized]. 
16. 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF 
ENGLAND 31 (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans. 1968-77).  
Blackstone also cites Coke, who repeats Bracton’s remarks.  See EDWARD 
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Ultimately, all these discussions trace back to Justinian’s 
Digest, where both Paul and Ulpian discuss the status of monstrous 
births,17 and beyond that to the Laws of the Twelve Tables, which 
stated (characteristically laconically) that “a dreadfully deformed 
child shall be killed.”18  The evident discomfort behind these 
remarks relates to long popular traditions regarding unusual births–
for example conjoined twins.  On the one hand, such children were 
historically associated with presumptions of the sexual impropriety 
of their parents, specifically with bestiality.  On the other hand 
they were held to be portents of disaster and divine disfavor.19  
Clearly, popular opinion, at least, put the monster’s status as a 
human being in doubt, and the law followed suit in its hesitance to 
treat such children as persons. 
 
 
COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A 
COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 7.b, 29.b (Francis Hargrave & Charles Butler 
eds., 1853). 
17. Dig. 1.5.14, in THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN (Alan Watson trans. & ed., 
1985):  
Paul, Views, book 4: Not included in the class of children are those 
abnormally procreated in a shape totally different from human form, for 
example, if a woman brings forth some kind of monster or prodigy.  
But any offspring which has more than the natural number of limbs 
used by man may in a sense be said to be fully formed, and will 
therefore be counted among children.  
Dig. 50.16.135, id.:  
Ulpian, Lex Julia et Papia, book 4: Someone will ask, if a woman has 
given birth to someone unnatural, monstrous or weak or something 
which in appearance or voice is unprecedented, not of human 
appearance, but some other offspring of an animal rather than of a man, 
whether she should benefit, since she gave birth.  And it is better that 
even a case like this should benefit the parents; for there are no grounds 
for penalizing them because they observed such statutes as they could, 
nor should loss be forced on the mother because things turned out ill. 
18. XII. Tab. 4.1, in 3 REMAINS OF OLD LATIN 441 (E.H. Warmington 
trans., 1961). 
19. See David Cressy, Monstrous Births and Credible Reports: Portents, 
Texts, and Testimonies, in TRAVESTIES AND TRANSGRESSIONS IN TUDOR AND 
STUART ENGLAND: TALES OF DISCORD AND DISSENSION 29 (2000); ZAKIYA 
HANAFI, THE MONSTER IN THE MACHINE: MAGIC, MEDICINE, AND THE 
MARVELOUS IN THE TIME OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (2000); and DUDLEY 
WILSON, SIGNS AND PORTENTS: MONSTROUS BIRTHS FROM THE MIDDLE AGES 
TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1993). 
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Domat’s monster is something of a test case, an exception to 
prove the rule.  It is a problem deliberately posed because it 
challenges categories, while at the same time having a certain 
practical importance.20  But how does the monster fit into Gaius’ 
paradigm of persons-things-obligations, a structure that underlies 
the work of all of these authors?  Domat, in treating the monster 
under persons, follows the Digest, which puts the main discussion 
of the case of the monster under the title “Human Status,” thus 
emphasizing the monster’s nature.  Blackstone, however, puts the 
monster in his book on the rights of things; he is less concerned 
with what the monster is than with what the monster can and 
cannot do (namely, inherit).  This point is crucial:  where we start 
the analysis in large measure determines where it will end up. 
Domat gives us some hints as to taxonomy by bringing forward 
issues that remain implicit in his Roman sources.  Following Paul, 
he says specifically that monstrous births that do not have human 
form “are not considered to be persons” and are not counted as the 
children of those who bear them.21  Those with “the essentials of 
human form,” by contrast, are considered to be the children of their 
parents, though Domat does not say whether or not they are legally 
reputed to be persons (most likely they would be).  Again 
following the Digest, this time Ulpian, Domat recognizes the 
difficulty of this position, since such children “count as [children] 
with respect to their parents,” and so they are considered to be their 
children for the purposes of privileges and exemptions dependent 
on the number of offspring.22
At this point Domat breaks from his Roman sources and adds a 
footnote that changes the terms of the question. He notes, “We can 
add, as another explanation for this rule, that these monsters are a 
 
20. As is amply demonstrated today by the difficult moral, legal, and ethical 
issues raised by the separation of conjoined twins.  See the fascinating English 
case Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) No. 1, [2000] 
H.R.L.R. 721 (England, C.A.).  For commentary on this case, see especially 
George J. Annas, The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life: Lessons from 
Cannibalism, Euthanasia, Abortion, and the Court-Ordered Killing of One 
Conjoined Twin to Save the Other, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1275 (2001); the 
symposium in 9:3 MED. L. REV. (Autumn 2001); and ALICE DOMURAT DREGER, 
ONE OF US: CONJOINED TWINS AND THE FUTURE OF THE NORMAL (2004). 
21. DOMAT, supra note 13 at 13. Compare Dig. 50.16.135, which suggests 
the opposite. 
22. DOMAT, id.   
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greater burden than other children.”23  This note changes the terms 
of the discussion in an interesting way, because we get a hint of 
exactly what rides on the solution to the taxonomic question of 
what the monster is.  Domat’s footnote moves us in a very 
different direction:  it presents a situational definition of the person 
that points out the tensions between taxonomy and the social 
function–in this case the human needs–of what is being classified. 
I will come back to this point shortly. 
Still, we have not answered the question: if these children that 
our pre-modern forebears viewed as monstrous are not persons (or 
if they are persons only imperfectly and for specific purposes, 
rather like slaves in the antebellum American South),24 what are 
they?  According to the logic of Gaius’ schema, they must fit 
somewhere, since the tripartite division is an exhaustive structuring 
of the private law–as Gaius put it, “All our law is about persons, 
things or actions.”25  These children would seem not to be things, 
which Domat defines as “everything that God created for man,”26 
but since Domat divides things into those in commerce and those 
not in commerce, perhaps monsters without human form (and also 
Wood’s severed leg?) might be things not in commerce.27   Indeed, 
there is evidence that in England parents or others sometimes 
exhibited such children for profit, and these cases periodically 
came before the courts of common law or Equity.  Though not 
 
23. Id. at 13 n. x (On peut ajoûter, pour une autre raison de cette regle, que 
ces monstres sont plus à charge que ne sont les autres enfans).  This point 
occurs neither in the Digest nor in its medieval gloss, and seems to have 
originated with Domat.  It occurs regularly in the other editions of Domat I have 
examined–for example in (Paris: Aux dépens de la Société, 1745), vol. 1, p. 13 
and (Paris: Nyon, 1777), vol. 1, p. 19–but confirmation of its origins must await 
further study of the earliest editions of the work. 
24. Slaves were non-persons in some situations, persons in others, three-
fifths persons in still others.  See Malick W. Ghachem, The Slave’s Two Bodies: 
The Life of an American Legal Fiction, 60 WM. & MARY Q. 809 (2003). 
25. G. 1.8, in THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS 23 (W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson 
trans., 1988). 
26. DOMAT, supra note 13 at 16 (tout ce que Dieu a creé [sic] pour 
l’homme). 
27. Compare BAUD, supra note 9 at 78-88 (arguing that the human body 
should be considered a thing not in commerce rather than a person).  Baud cites 
the Digest on monsters as well; id. at 71. See generally ISABELLE MOINE, LES 
CHOSES HORS COMMERCE: UNE APPROCHE DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE JURIDIQUE 
(1997); and Grégoire Loiseau, Typologie des choses hors du commerce, 2000 
REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 47. 
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surprisingly the courts did not deal explicitly with the question of 
classification (though as always the issues are there, in the 
background), the results suggest that these children were viewed as 
being outside the market, for moral if not taxonomic reasons.  In 
the 1682 Chancery case Herring v. Walround, for example, a 
“monstrous birth” (conjoined twin girls) was shown to the public 
for money, and the exhibition continued even after the children 
died. The Chancellor reportedly “most disliked these Doings” and 
ordered the body (bodies?) buried forthwith.28  Treating Domat’s 
monster as a thing–even a thing not in commerce–would however 
seem to be at odds with Domat’s remarks about the esteem of the 
parents and the care that such children require, which point in a 
different direction, towards the language of relationship and 
obligation, and thus to the third branch of Gaius’ schema.  While 
the monster is not itself an obligation (though how do we 
conceptualize obligations without in part reifying them?), it clearly 
engages that aspect of the law.  By its very nature the monster 
embodies dependence on others (its parents, society more 
generally), and so it elicits bonds of relationship and 
interconnectedness that call for a situational understanding that is 
at odds with the more ontological analysis characteristic of the 
categories of persons and things. 
The examples of the monster and the severed leg illustrate the 
difficulty in isolating and circumscribing the physical world (not to 
mention the world of human interactions) so as to make it fit neatly 
into a single preordained category.  Domat’s monster is neither a 
person nor a thing nor an obligation, and yet it is all three at the 
same time.  Wherever we might put it, it reaches into (or holds 
onto) the other categories, claiming aspects of all of them.  Even 
concentrating on the summa divisio of the paradigm and limiting 
the choices to either a thinglike person or a personlike thing is 
insufficient, since as Domat indicates the relations between such a 
child and others are crucial to its nature.  Moreover, the monster 
simply points out in starker relief what is true also for everything 
we subject to legal analysis: in different aspects and from different 
points of view everything partakes of all three categories, and so 
defies the neat categorization that Gaius’ schema as classically 
conceptualized demands. 
 
28. Herring v. Walround (1682), 2 Chan. Cas. 110, 22 E.R. 870 (England, 
Ch.) (“A monstrous Birth shown for Money, a Misdemeanor”). 
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I would like to turn now to a closer examination of Gaius’ 
schema and the function it and legal categories more generally 
serve in the civil law.  Gaius divided the world of private law into 
persons, things, and actions, and in so doing he created the three 
fundamental categories of the civil law.  But by this he also–and 
this is my point in what follows–necessarily posited the existence 
of boundaries between the categories–points of contact where one 
category gives way to another.  Categories have a seductive effect, 
however:  like black holes, they tend to pull things towards their 
centers, leaving their edges, as well as their interactions with their 
neighbors, as ill-defined areas of discomfort.  In what follows, I 
want to turn attention away from the middles of the categories and 
focus instead on the boundaries between them.  In so doing, I hope 
to shift our understanding of legal classification away from a 
process of binary, either/or decisions that place material in the 
appropriate pigeonhole and towards a more dynamic model that 
emphasizes the interactions between categories such as “persons” 
and “things.”  I am particularly interested in the possibilities of 
rethinking the category of persons, since I believe it has not been 
given its due, at least in part because it tends to be on the losing 
side of binary taxonomic decisions.  Exploring the dynamic 
interactions between categories can, I think, reclaim a space for the 
person against encroachments by its neighboring categories, while 
at the same time add dimensions to the concept of the person that 
have been underemphasized or ignored in the law.  Since the civil 
law is an integrated system, rethinking persons necessarily 
involves rethinking things and obligations, as we will see, though I 
leave it to others to explore these implications. 
 
I.  BOUNDARIES 
 
Gaius’ taxonomy privileges a view that something must fit into 
one and only one of the categories, and distinct sets of rules are 
engaged and different legal actions made possible depending on 
where something is put.  Since the system is exhaustive, Domat’s 
monster, for instance, must be either a person, or a thing, or an 
obligation.  No fourth option exists (like the categories “others” or 
“et cetera” beloved of common lawyers),29 and no straddling of 
boundaries is possible.  This is not to say classificatory problems 
 
29. See WADDAMS, supra note 7, at 11-12.  
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do not exist. Roman jurists long ago pointed out difficulties–
Ulpian, for example, noted that the household partook of both 
persons and things, depending on the point of view from which it 
is examined.30  More recently, we can point to the examples of the 
corporation–which can be seen as a person in status, as a thing in 
relation to its shareholders, and as a nexus of contracts 
organizationally31–or of profitable biotechnological innovations 
derived from the human body.32
The logic of legal classification is still however largely driven 
by an understanding of the boundaries between categories as clear 
lines necessitating either/or choices–difficult choices, to be sure, 
but choices nonetheless.  We see this in the logic of civil codes, 
which locate different issues in distinct books, and in legal 
education, which in the civil law world usually mirrors the 
structure of codes and treats persons, things, and obligations in 
separate courses and in separate textbooks.  The effect of this is to 
keep the categories conceptually insulated from one another: 
viewing them as boxes within which to file legal data puts the 
emphasis on difference rather than on overlap and connection. 
In the case of Gaius’ schema, the tendency is to view it 
according to the structure of Gaius’ Institutes, and so as a series of 
binary oppositions arranged in a linear fashion, first persons then 
things and finally actions (now obligations): 
 
Persons Things Obligations 
 
This linear view creates two interfaces between categories, and 
scholars have recently begun exploring their implications:  the 
                                                                                                             
30. Dig. 50.16.195.1, supra note 17:  
Let us consider how the designation of ‘household’ is understood.  And 
indeed it is understood in various ways; for it relates both to things and 
to persons:  to things, as, for instance, in the Law of the Twelve Tables 
in the words ‘let the nearest agnate have the household.’  The 
designation of household, however, refers to persons when the law 
speaks of patron and freedman: ‘from that household’ or ‘to that 
household;’ and here it is agreed that the law is talking of individual 
persons. 
31. Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate 
Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 583 (1999). 
32. E. RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE 
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS (1996). 
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persons-things interface33 and the things-obligations interface.34  
This sort of relational thinking is welcome, since it begins to make 
Gaius’ static structure more dynamic, but the either/or binary 
oppositions in this view are too limited to deal with the sort of 
taxonomic mixing that cases like Domat’s monster bring up. 
If we loop the linear paradigm around into a circle, we create a 
new interface between persons and obligations, which gives us a 
place to analyze issues such as the relationships raised in Domat’s 
footnote mentioned earlier: 
 
 
 
This does not fully solve our problem, however, since the 
system still breaks down into a series of binary either/or pairs.  
This third–and still shadowy–interface between persons and 
obligations is important, even crucial to understanding the system, 
since it brings into the analysis issues of relationship that are 
otherwise left out.35  What is needed is a model that incorporates 
the multi-valence and fluidity of all three categories, a model that 
                                                                                                             
33. Besides the other contributions to this workshop, see especially 
Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?–Toward Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972); Margaret Jane Radin, Property 
and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); BAUD, supra note 9; Radhika 
Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359 (2000); and 
MARGARET DAVIES & NGAIRE NAFFINE, ARE PERSONS PROPERTY? LEGAL 
DEBATES ABOUT PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY (2001). 
34. E.g. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 
(1970); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001). 
35. See the fascinating article by Catherine Labrusse-Riou beginning to 
explore this interface: De quelques apports du droit des contrats au droit des 
personnes, in ÉTUDES OFFERTES A JACQUES GHESTIN: LE CONTRAT AU DEBUT DU 
XXIE SIECLE 499 (Gilles Gouveaux et al. eds., 2001). 
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can account for the constantly shifting analytical alliances between 
them. 
I would like to suggest that we can approach a visualization of 
the dynamic view of Gaius’ paradigm that I have in mind if we 
think of the private law not as the usual spectrum, nor even as a 
circle (with obligations linking back to touch persons), but rather 
as a triangle, where classification takes place within the area 
enclosed by the triangle, rather than along its perimeter: 
 
 
 
Obligations Things 
Persons 
This model, I think, makes it clear that Gaius’ schema 
represents a closed system, embracing the private law.36  At the 
same time, I believe it provides a more realistic graphical 
illustration of the interrelations between all three categories than 
does the more familiar linear model. 
Each point of the triangle, then, represents one of the 
categories, either persons, or things, or obligations.  As we move 
towards the center of the triangle, we get a more and more 
balanced mingling of all three categories–we might think of the 
blending of three colors at the center, rather than sharp lines 
dividing three zones.  Interactions primarily between two 
categories take place close to the sides of the triangle, while 
 
36. The ambiguities and difficulties of classification between public law and 
private law are significant in themselves and require analysis, but are beyond the 
scope of this article.  It seems clear that an interface does exist between private 
and public law (one thinks of the fluid boundary between delict and crime, or 
between the private and public aspects of fundamental rights and freedoms), 
though representing this interface graphically presents challenges (what is the 
area outside the private law triangle: public law? non-law? both?). 
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relatively unproblematic examples of each category would be close 
to the triangle’s points.37  For example, we might place things 
without an owner (such as wild animals) at the extreme point of the 
things category–though clearly things and so within the private 
law, until occupied by an owner they do not interact with 
persons.38  
I do not want to push this kind of structuralist modeling too far, 
but I think it does offer at least two heuristic advantages.  First, it 
brings into play the third interface between persons and 
obligations, and so it allows us to bring ideas of interaction and 
relationship into our legal concepts of persons and things, rather 
than isolating them from these ideas.  Second, it makes it clear that 
all three of the categories play a role in virtually any classificatory 
decision:  as I just indicated, it is extremely rare that something 
will unproblematically belong to one and only one category, 
without influence from the others. 
In other words, this model can help move the process of legal 
taxonomy away from the empiricism of simple either/or choices 
and towards a rhetorical and normative process of constructive and 
constitutive interaction between different areas of legal knowledge.  
Though binary oppositions might be cognitively easier for the 
mind to grasp, the addition of a third option–particularly one in 
dynamic relation to the others–opens up additional analytical 
nuances and possibilities.  Our legal categories are fictions39–they 
 
37. I do not want to suggest that moving towards the triangle’s points 
moves us closer to essences or archetypes.  All three categories–persons, things, 
and obligations–are juridical constructions that work normatively to structure 
legal problems and subject matter rather than as strictly empirical labels. 
Instead, moving towards the points of the triangle reflects a decreasing intensity 
of interrelations with the other categories.  For an insightful example of the 
analysis of the normative implications one of the categories–persons–see Ngaire 
Naffine, Who Are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects, 
66 MOD. L. REV. 346 (2003). 
38. In passing, one might ask whether the other two points of the triangle–
persons untouched by things or obligations, and obligations untouched by 
persons or things–are conceptually possible.  Obligations, it would seem, are 
not, since by definition they involve both persons and an object: see e.g. 1 
ROBERT-JOSEPH POTHIER, TRAITÉ DES OBLIGATIONS in ŒUVRES DE POTHIER 79 
(nouvelle édition 1821).  By contrast, persons, or at least human persons, are 
inextricably linked to other persons (if not to things), which gives rise to certain 
natural obligations linked to status (as between parent and child).  
39. See Yan Thomas, Fictio legis: l’empire de la fiction romaine et ses 
limites médiévales, 21 DROITS 17 (1995), discussed in Alain Pottage, 
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have a long pedigree in the civil law, of course, but they are 
fictions nonetheless–and it is essential to ask what we are calling 
on our fictions to do and how well they are doing it. 
Reconceiving Gaius’ schema as interactive has important 
implications for understanding the person in law, as it forces us to 
shift our attention from ontological status (is something a person or 
a thing?) to how it is positioned or embedded within a social 
matrix of relationships–a concern central to the feminist critique of 
traditional views of personhood in law.40  At the same time, by 
focusing on the interfaces between the categories and on the 
interactions that take place at these zones of juncture, we can begin 
to counter the colonization of one category by another, which is an 
inevitable byproduct of binary taxonomy and clear boundaries 
between categories.  The category of persons has I think long 
suffered encroachments by its neighbors, each of which deals with 
matter more congenial to the liberal model of law: objects of 
wealth on the one hand, and means of acquiring objects of wealth 
on the other.  I would like to turn now to look at these issues in the 
context of the persons-things interface. 
 
II. THE PERSONS-THINGS INTERFACE 
 
The traditional view has been that there is (indeed, that there 
must be) a clear boundary between persons and things, which 
corresponds to the distinction between subject and object, being 
and having, the self and the world.41  Given the anthropocentrism 
at the heart of liberal humanism, this boundary is regarded as 
central to, even inherent in, the nature of human society.42  
 
 
Introduction: The Fabrication of Persons and Things, in LAW, ANTHROPOLOGY 
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL: MAKING PERSONS AND THINGS 1, 12-
18 (Alain Pottage & Martha Mundy eds., 2003).  
40. See especially Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy, 1 YALE J. 
LAW & FEMINISM 7 (1989); Jennifer Nedelsky, Property in Potential Life?: A 
Relational Approach to Choosing Legal Categories, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 343 
(1993); and ROBERT LECKEY, CONTEXTUAL SUBJECTS: FAMILY, STATE, AND 
RELATIONAL THEORY (2008). 
41. See generally Pottage, supra note 39; and Alain Sériaux, La notion 
juridique de patrimoine: brèves notations civilistes sur le verbe avoir, 1994 
REV.TRIM. DR. CIV. 801. 
42. See generally DAVIES & NAFFINE, supra note 33, at 2; Ross Poole, On 
Being a Person, 74 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 38, 46 (1996); and DONALD R. 
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Disagreement largely centers on the placement of this boundary 
(particularly in areas like the status of embryos or fetuses43 or 
biotechnology44) rather than on its existence.  Conflict arises from 
(or at least is exacerbated by) the fact that the nature and location 
of this boundary engages so many different normative discourses. 
Law, religion, science, ethics, and morality each address the basic 
question of what is a person and what is a thing, but give widely 
divergent answers to it. 
In practice, however, the boundary between persons and things 
blurs.  In some contexts, human beings are effectively treated as 
things (for example as objects of the power of the state or of 
employers),45 while sometimes certain things are (or conceivably 
should be) treated as persons or parts of persons (such as human 
body parts,46 or objects with particular emotional connections to a 
human being,47 or certain animals,48 or things of common benefit 
like the environment49).  The problem is that in a system with a 
 
 
KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION 8 (1990).  This is of course a hotly contested question, which has 
inspired a vast literature.  For one challenge to this anthropocentrism, see 
CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL 
PLURALISM (1987).  
43. See e.g. Robert Kouri, Réflexions sur le statut juridique du foetus, 15 
R.J.T. 193 (1980); Martine Herzog-Evans, Homme, homme juridique et 
humanité de l’embryon, 2000 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 65; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, 
Rights of Embryo and Foetus in Private Law, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 633 (2002); 
and Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to 
Embryos and Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 159 (2005). 
44. See e.g. GOLD, supra note 32; Alain Pottage, Our Original Inheritance, 
in LAW, ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL: MAKING 
PERSONS AND THINGS 249 (Alain Pottage & Martha Mundy eds., 2003). 
45. See e.g. Anne Barron, Legal Discourse and the Colonisation of the Self 
in the Modern State, in POST-MODERN LAW: ENLIGHTENMENT, REVOLUTION 
AND THE DEATH OF MAN 107, 109 (Anthony Carty ed., 1990). 
46. BAUD, supra note 9; and Stephen R. Munzer, An Uneasy Case Against 
Property Rights in Body Parts, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 259 (1994). 
47. Radin, supra note 33, esp. 959-61. 
48. Alain Roy, Papa, Maman, Bébé et… Fido! L’animal de compagnie en 
droit civil ou l’émergence d’un nouveau sujet de droit, 82 CAN. BAR REV. 791 
(2003); and Simon Cushing, Against “Humanism”: Speciesism, Personhood, 
and Preference, 34 J. SOC. PHIL. 556 (2003). 
49. Stone, supra note 33; and Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have 
Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals Reach? A Pluralist 
Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
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clear boundary between persons and things, a choice must be made 
for one category or the other, which amounts in most cases to a 
choice between treating something as extrapatrimonial or 
patrimonial, as outside or within the market. 
Our liberal Western world grants property discourse 
tremendous power to transform our view of what constitutes a 
thing and in so doing to colonize other areas of law.  Personhood 
discourse, by contrast, has largely lacked countervailing power, 
both because it has been less coherently theorized and because its 
characteristic concerns are less easily translated into the language 
of law.  For this reason, the negotiation between the categories of 
persons and things has generally taken place from the standpoint of 
the latter.50  John Austin argued a century and a half ago for the 
logic of viewing persons as exceptions to universal reification 
rather than seeing things as exceptions to universal agency,51 and 
the comparative historical fates of the law of property and the law 
of persons bear this out.  In cold instrumentalist logic, whatever 
can be treated as a thing is treated as one, unless there are 
compelling reasons to the contrary (which generally derive from 
the anthropocentric bias just mentioned).52  Even with the abolition 
of slavery, the most egregious commodification of the human 
being, the patrimonialization of aspects of the person–one thinks of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50. Compare C.B. Macpherson, Human Rights as Property Rights, in THE 
RISE AND FALL OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND OTHER PAPERS 76, 84 (1985), who 
argues that hitching other concepts (such as human rights) to the power of 
property might be useful in establishing them. 
51. 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
POSITIVE LAW 686 (5th ed. by Robert Campbell, 1885): “The Law of Things in 
short is The Law—the entire corpus juris; minus certain portions of it affecting 
peculiar classes of persons, which, for the sake of commodious exposition, are 
severed from the whole of which they are a part, and placed in separate heads or 
chapters.” 
52. An early critic of this was Louis Josserand, La personne humaine dans 
le commerce juridique, D. 1932.CHRON.1, 4. 
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privacy,53 image,54 body parts and genetic information55–has 
worked towards the assimilation of persons into things.  In 
common-law jurisdictions this is perhaps unsurprising, as the 
concept of the person in the common law has steadily atrophied, 
which leaves the courts little choice but to designate as property 
anything that has no more obvious category.56  But even in the 
civil law the power of property rights makes them a beacon for 
litigants, and the extrapatrimonial is increasingly becoming 
patrimonialized.57
Boundaries constantly move, which means categories are fluid. 
Given the central importance of both persons and property in 
Western liberal and humanist ideologies, defining what happens in 
the zone of interaction between the categories of persons and 
things becomes crucially important.  It makes a profound 
 
53. For an early discussion of privacy as a form of intangible property, see 
Note, Modern Developments of the Jurisdiction of Equity, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 
533, 534 (1907), cited in Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the 
Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 
BUFF. L. REV. 325, 334 (1980). The recasting of certain aspects of privacy as a 
form of property right continued in William L. Prosser’s influential article 
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
54. In the United States, though there were earlier antecedents, the line of 
cases interpreting the right to one’s image as a proprietary right begins with 
Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. 
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), which established the “right of publicity” in 
American law. See generally Eric H. Reiter, Personality and Patrimony: 
Comparative Perspectives on the Right to One’s Image, 76 TUL. L. REV. 673 
(2002). 
55. GOLD, supra note 32.  See also the famous decision in Moore v. Regents 
of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. S.C. 1990), cert. denied, 499 
U.S. 936 (1991). 
56. See Eric H. Reiter, Gaius, le droit des personnes et la common law 
anglo-américaine, in 2 PERSONNE ET RES PUBLICA 163 (Jacques Bouineau ed., 
2008). 
57. An example is the legal status of clientele (particularly a physician’s 
patients), which has been the object of vigorous debate in France. See Thierry 
Revet, Clientèle civile, 2001 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 167; Judith Rochfeld, Les 
ambiguïtés de la ‘patientèle’ ou comment une chose qui n’en est toujours pas 
une peut désormais constituer licitement l’objet d’un contrat de cession…, 
J.C.P. 2001.I 301.432; François Vialla, Un revirement spectaculaire en matière 
de patrimonialisation des clientèles civiles, J.C.P. 2001.II 10 452.69.  On the 
patrimonial/extrapatrimonial distinction, see generally Grégoire Loiseau, Des 
droits patrimoniaux de la personnalité en droit français, 42 MCGILL L.J. 319 
(1997); and Reiter, supra note 54, at 681-705. 
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difference in the character of a legal system whether classification 
proceeds from the basis of the primacy of persons or the primacy 
of things, and different justifications are required for each. 
The problem with allowing the category of things–and more 
particularly the concept of property–to set its own boundaries is 
that property today is largely conceived in market terms:  courts (if 
not individuals) deal more comfortably with things considered as 
wealth valued in monetary terms than with things considered as 
unique objects valued subjectively.58  This insulates the category 
“things” from both the personhood concerns of the category 
“persons” (which touch on subjective value) and from the 
relational issues of the category “obligations” (which touch on 
responsibility and duty), both of which potentially bring to our 
analysis of things important concerns not captured in market 
calculus.  The ostensibly universal logic and language of the 
market make property seem the great equalizer, a vulgate into 
which virtually anything may be translated.  The normative 
implications of this process are too important to be accepted 
uncritically. 
Even our language for taking things out of the property system 
presupposes evaluative market language as the norm.59  The very 
linguistic form of concepts like “extrapatrimoniality,” “not in 
commerce,” and “inalienability” presents them as exceptions to the 
predominant paradigms of “patrimony,” “commerce,” and 
“alienability” respectively.  The association between things and the 
market is so close that it seems somehow perverse to say that there 
might be things that are “not in commerce” yet still property.  This 
is particularly so with regard to the person and the rights closely 
connected to personhood (such as privacy, bodily integrity, and so 
forth–the extrapatrimonial personality rights of the civil law60).  
Though not all alienability need be market driven,61 and though a 
patrimony also theoretically contains things of value that are not 
 
58. See generally Bernard Rudden, Things as Thing and Things as Wealth, 
14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 81 (1994). 
59. See Alain Pottage, The Inscription of Life in Law: Genes, Patents, and 
Bio-Politics, 61 MOD. L. REV. 740, 765 (1998) (noting that “to create or defend 
an exception is to concede the claims of the rule”). 
60. See generally Adrian Popovici, Personality Rights—A Civil Law 
Concept, 50 LOY. L. REV. 349 (2004). 
61. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 
(1987). 
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owned, the rhetorical power of property discourse within liberal 
society is such that fine gradations are difficult to sustain against it. 
Consider the popular notion of “identity theft.”62  The language 
of property is more viscerally evocative in modern Western society 
than alternative terms like “appropriation of personality” (which 
itself still echoes property language) or “violation of personality,” 
which conceptualize the problem (more naturally) as a personhood 
rather than a property issue.  The association with theft serves to 
patrimonialize identity (itself a slippery concept) into an object of 
property and thus to link it to ownership, the most powerful right 
in the arsenal of the liberal legal world. 
This subtle politics of labeling is closely related to the equally 
subtle politics of taxonomy.  If we reduce classification at the 
interface between persons and things to a question of the scope of 
property rights, we create a slippery slope whose bottom is the 
position where anything to which the creativity of a market-
dominated society can assign a value is brought within the property 
regime to be subjected to the full panoply of broad legally-
enforced rights of ownership.  The category of persons hardly 
stands a chance against this–it becomes little more than a 
placeholder for things not yet propertized. 
Allowing the persons-things interface to become a one-way 
membrane that permits only ever-increasing commodification 
misses the potential of the other kinds of conceptual exchanges that 
might take place between persons and things.  Categorization at the 
persons-things interface is more than simply coming up with two 
definitions, one for persons, another for things, and choosing the 
proper pigeonhole in which to file something new.  An interface 
between categories means that the categories are related to one 
another, mutually and on equal terms, and not simply as colonizer-
colonized.  This allows us to see not just how aspects of the person 
can function as things, but also how our concept of the person 
depends on connections to certain things. 
Pushing things further, persons and things are just part of the 
analysis:  questions of classification really involve all three parts of 
the private law–persons, things, and obligations–working together 
to set the terms of our interaction with the world and the degree of 
 
62. E.g. Sean B. Hoar, Identity Theft: The Crime of the New Millenium, 80 
OR. L. REV. 1423 (2001); and Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the 
Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227 (2003). 
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influence the world will have on us.  Broadening the analysis 
beyond a binary opposition–and away from the transactional 
overtones of property discourse–allows us to enrich the persons-
things interface with the relational concerns characteristic of the 
third part of our triangle.  I think this allows a better understanding 
of the role things play in human relationships and the ways in 
which personhood and market concerns interact in defining these 
relationships.63
The standard sites for discussing issues like these are with 
respect to the human body and personality rights like privacy.64  
Both of these examples sit squarely in the liminal zone between 
persons and things, since they are associated with the human being 
but are detachable and so transactable in market terms.  At the 
same time, they touch on ideas of relationship, interconnection, 
and responsibility associated with the language of obligations.  A 
stark binary choice–person or thing–is unsatisfactory.  Market 
discourse makes us uncomfortable in this context, since we are 
generally unwilling to treat kidneys like automobiles, but at the 
same time a kidney is no more a person than Buick is (unless we 
are willing to get creative with the fiction of legal personality65).  
In a system where the category of persons is rigidly circumscribed 
in opposition to things, the taxonomic possibilities for things like 
kidneys or one’s image are lacking, and such things have nowhere 
to go except somewhere along the property spectrum.  And once 
classed as things, the assumptions about the property institution 
take over, and some degree of market commodification is the 
result.66
The civil law distinction between extrapatrimonial and 
patrimonial rights perhaps gets closest to what I mean, since it 
distinguishes between the personal aspects of rights (their 
 
63. For interesting insights into this question, see Jennifer Nedelsky, 
Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 1 (1993); and David 
Lametti, The Concept of Property: Relations Through Objects of Social Wealth, 
53 U.T.L.J. 325 (2003). 
64. See the literature cited supra note 33. 
65. Naffine, supra note 37 (on the different arguments and justifications 
behind the idea of legal personality). 
66. See Richard Gold, Owning Our Bodies: An Examination of Property 
Law and Biotechnology, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1167, 1230-31 (1995). I am 
more skeptical than Gold about the appropriateness of applying even a changed 
property discourse to things intimately connected to the person. 
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personhood qualities) and their public aspects (their value- or 
market-oriented side).  The problem, however, is that concepts like 
extrapatrimoniality and “not in commerce” do not do full justice to 
what is going on at the persons-things interface, since they already 
assume both the language of property discourse and an either/or 
view of classification.  To address this problem of the insufficiency 
of binary choices, various writers have made a case for 
intermediate categories–examples include Jean-Pierre Baud’s idea 
of “things without price,” or Gérard Farjat’s idea of “centers of 
interest,” or Geoffrey Samuel’s work on “interests” in the common 
law.67  Such intermediate categories, these authors argue, could 
encompass things like the human body or the family relationship or 
even Domat’s monster that do not fit easily elsewhere. 
Multiplying categories is not the answer, however, since it 
simply adds new boundaries and thus creates new either/or 
dilemmas.  Nor is it feasible, I think, to abandon categories entirely 
and adopt a more pragmatic, situational model of private law in the 
manner of the common law, where categories are infinitely 
expandable, overlapping, and non-exclusive (as in Halsbury’s 
Laws of England68 or the Canadian Abridgement69).  The civil law 
comes with a structural history that has become part of the law 
itself.  This structure can be modified (an example is the 
consolidation of family law from elements drawn from persons, 
things, and obligations), but the traditional foundation based on 
Gaius has proved resilient and of continuing utility. 
 
67. BAUD, supra note 9, at 217-22; Gérard Farjat, Entre les personnes et les 
choses, les centres d’intérêts: prolégomènes pour une recherché, 2002 
REV.TRIM. DR. CIV. 221; and Geoffrey Samuel, The Notion of an Interest as a 
Formal Concept in English and in Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW 
BEFORE THE COURTS 263 (Guy Canivet, Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve 
eds., 2004). 
68. HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND (4th ed. 1973).  The categories in 
Halsbury, of which there is a growing list of more than 160, range from the 
highly general (Contract, Tort, Real Property, Restitution) to the narrowly 
defined (Agriculture, Animals, Auction, Aviation, Barristers).  Overlap is 
common: for instance we find both Tort and Negligence, Contract and Sale of 
Goods, and so on. 
69. CANADIAN ABRIDGEMENT (2d ed. 1992).  As with Halsbury, here the 
categories are numerous (about one hundred), of varying degrees of generality, 
and frequently overlapping (Contract, but also Sale of Land, Insurance, 
Employment Law, and so on). 
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It seems to me more useful to explore the possibilities of the 
idea of interfaces.  By this I mean a zone where the categories 
mingle and blend:  where the linkages between personhood and 
property can be articulated while resorting neither to full market 
commodification nor to full legal subjectivity.  An interface is not 
simply a new either/or choice:  it is a space where the answer is 
“both,” a zone of interaction where either category alone would be 
insufficient to deal with the complexities of the subject matter, and 
would result in an unacceptable narrowing or distortion of what 
was being categorized.  This idea of interaction, however, points to 
the relational ideas characteristic of the third area of our triangle–
the law of obligations–and indicates that the analysis around the 
concepts of persons and things is more complicated than even a 
dual persons-things interface alone can capture. 
 
III. BRINGING IN THE PERSONS-OBLIGATIONS INTERFACE 
 
The third category in Gaius’ schema has been the most 
obviously fluid both in conceptualization and in content, which is 
at least partly due to its role as the legal site for concepts that 
mediate between self and society.70  It represents links or 
interactions between persons or things, and so, I would argue, 
touches qualities of movement between categories, of moral 
engagement, and of relationship. 
This category embraces a wide variety of subject matter–Peter 
Stein has called obligations the “joker in the pack of civil law 
categories”71–and this is one reason why it is so difficult to pin 
down.  The definitional shifts surrounding this category over the 
centuries are fascinating, and indicate a searching for a way to 
generalize the different possible links between persons and 
things:72  “obligations” looks one way, putting the stress on 
interpersonal relations, while “ways of acquiring property” looks 
 
70. KELLEY, supra note 42 at 8 has described it as “the theoretical point 
where self-consciousness becomes social consciousness and where the defining 
faculty of human will, as expressed in language as well as behavior, becomes 
essential both for social activity and for legal regulation.” 
71. Stein, supra note 1 at 158. 
72. ANDRÉ-JEAN ARNAUD, ESSAI D’ANALYSE STRUCTURALE DU CODE CIVIL 
FRANÇAIS: LA RÈGLE DU JEU DANS LA PAIX BOURGEOISE 92 (1973) (making a 
similar point with reference to the mixture of subjects found in Book 3 of the 
French Code civil). 
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another way, emphasizing the relations between persons and 
things. 
As I have suggested, the traditional linear model of Gaius’ 
paradigm is misleading, since it relates this third category only 
with things, and not with persons.  In law persons interact both 
with other persons and with things:  contracts of sale, lease, and 
deposit, for example, involve things (and persons too, of course), 
while contracts of mandate, partnership, and employment involve 
persons, their status, and their interpersonal relationships much 
more than their things.  The element common to both is the 
creation and governance of relationships. 
Viewed broadly, then, this third category brings to the 
statically conceived categories of persons and things relationships 
and interactions of all kinds: from social or affective relationships 
(such as aspects of family), to legal relationships (such as 
employer/employee and aspects of parenthood or marriage), to 
relationships with things (such as custodial obligations).  These 
various kinds of interactions, moreover, call attention to qualities 
such as affect and power that are crucial to understanding how 
legal systems actually function, but that are otherwise missing 
from the schema.  In short, if we view the category “persons” as 
the realm of being and the category “things” as the realm of 
having, this third category works with the others to emphasize the 
intermediary states of becoming and getting.  Brought into the 
persons-things mix, this focus on process rather than product 
brings into focus moral and ethical aspects of the law that 
otherwise tend to remain hidden and so difficult to articulate or 
conceptualize, and that work to change the terms of analysis of 
both persons and things. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To return to the examples with which I began, I think we can 
now see more clearly how both the leg in the barbeque smoker and 
Domat’s monster challenge the static and linear view of Gaius’ 
schema.  The leg, being too recognizably human to be clearly a 
commodity, but at the same time too detached to be clearly a 
person, fits neither category and so engages neither set of rules 
unproblematically.  As for monsters without human form, although 
Domat clearly excludes such beings from the category of persons, 
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we see that it is precisely the human qualities they do have 
(particularly their parentage, but also any physical resemblance to 
humans) that keep them from fitting clearly into the category of 
things.  Similarly, their lack of most of the usual formal attributes 
of humanity keeps them out of the category of persons: only in 
cases where such monsters have a sufficiently human form do they 
become persons.73  Their connection with each category–persons 
and things–is however colored by their interactions:  with their 
parents especially, but also with society generally and with the 
assumptions of others about their nature, their abilities, and their 
origins.  And it is these interactions, with their overtones of duty, 
responsibility, and obligation, that really add complexity–but also 
interest–to the problem of Domat’s monster. 
Though Domat’s treatment of the monster would not be the 
way we would discuss this issue today, his recognition of the 
interplay between form, nature, and particularly community is an 
excellent illustration of the issues that categorization in law must 
engage.  Taxonomy is a necessary evil in law, but how we do it is 
anything but necessary and need not be evil.  Categories shape the 
material being categorized, and discrete, coherent, and bounded 
categories invite us to view persons and things as themselves 
discrete, coherent, and bounded, though the richness of human 
experience says otherwise.  Moving beyond the limitations of this 
view of taxonomy and emphasizing instead fluidity and interaction 
can help us embrace rather than avoid complexity and 
multivalence in legal analysis, whether we are dealing with 
intangibles like the right to privacy or very tangible things like legs 
discovered in barbeque smokers. 
 
 
 
 
73. This pre-modern emphasis on the formal rather than the moral or other 
characteristics of humanity is interesting historically, though shocking in 
modern ethical terms. It is however disquieting to compare the often alarming 
rhetoric surrounding conjoined twins cited in DREGER, supra note 20. 
